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1 One of the most promising developments in our recent historiography of the Russian
Empire  has  been  a  growing  interest  in  military  history.  At  first  glance,  this  seems
incongruous, because the Russian Empire always was a military state governed by men in
uniform and expanding by military conquest to incorporate an enormous area from the
Oder  to  the  Pacific  and from the White  Sea  to  the  Black and Caspian Seas.  But  the
“community  of  scholars”  had other  priorities,  notably  in  social  and cultural  history,
neglecting not only military history but also foreign policy, law and economics. For this
reason alone, both editors must be congratulated for giving us a handsomely produced
collection of essays devoted to reforms in the Russian army.
2 It consists of fifteen articles discussing a variety of topics: the universal military service
law of l874 (Robert F. Baumann);  the multiethnic composition of the army (Mark von
Hagen); the Russian Boy Scouts (David R. Jones); strategic railroads (Jacob W. Kipp); three
pieces on military intelligence (D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Gudrun Persson, and
David Alan Rich), and one on the military press (Willis Brooks); the impact of the wars
with Napoleon and in the Caucasus (Frederick W. Kagan and Dmitrii I. Oleinikov); three
contributions on personalities by Paul Bushkovich, B. W. Menning and Oleg Airapetov.
The volume concludes with three essays: a “book review” by David M. McDonald pointing
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to  the  disdain  in  which  Russian  military  history  has  been  held  until  now,  and  two
thoughtful pieces by Dennis Showalter and William E. Odom, the latter raising questions
(not systematically asked in this volume) which “ought to be asked.” All in all, a very
valuable  contribution  to  Russian  military  history  which  will  challenge  historians  to
develop some of the issues raised here and more.
3 Some readers may object, for example, to the overwhelming preponderance given to the
post-l855 period and the neglect of the eighteenth century. This is not unusual, but it is
regrettable. The two and a half centuries from l650 to l9l7 included two very different
periods: one from the l650s to the l830s: a dynamic period, when the Russians were on the
offensive, confident in their strength and successful in their determination to establish
their hegemony in Eurasia; the other was marked by self-doubt, an inability to cope with
mounting economic and financial problems, when the rise of Germany and Japan placed
the Russians on the defensive. The emphasis placed in this book on the second period
conveys that pessimistic outlook. Certainly, no one steeped in the earlier period would
have written that Russia was engaged in “a constant race to avoid oblivion” (p. l) or that
the  discovery that  the  Russian army was  incompetent  was  shocking (p. 326).  Peter I,
Rumiantsev, Suvorov, Kutuzov, and Dibich would turn in their graves.
4 A second reservation concerns the “general  staff”:   two pieces  discuss  this  issue and
others make a reference to it, but the whole issue remains unclear. It is not entirely true
that the relationships between the “general staff” and the War Ministry were not well
thought out in l8l2-18l5.  The division was not  so much between the line and supply
agencies as a territorial one: the territories occupied by the army or armies in the field
were under their commanders in chief and had their own supply agencies; the others
came under the War Ministry. The question should have been asked why a general staff
existed only during the war of l8l2 (and until l832): was not its creation connected with
Russia’s strategy on an all-European scale and with unprecedented numbers in the field?
Could it be that save for this exceptional case, such a staff was not necessary because
fighting in the same theaters war after war predetermined how such and such a war was
to be fought? 
5      These are only some of the many questions which this book raises and which it could
not answer for lack of space. But we must all be grateful for its appearance and wish it
will encourage scholars and doctoral students to take up more of these issues which, as
General Odom suggests, “ought to be raised” in this new field of Russian military history.
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